Wolfgang Streeck en de uitgestelde crisis van het Democratisch Kapitalisme

Wolfgang Streeck in het bezette Maagdenhuis

Wolfgang Streeck in het bezette Maagdenhuis, zie de hele lezing hier.

Veel te weinig mensen stellen zich de cruciale vragen van onze tijd: waarom lijken we als samenleving steeds minder te zeggen hebben over de cruciale economische vraagstukken en hebben we al dertig jaar lang te maken met neoliberaal afbraak-beleid en waarom is niet langer toenemende welvaart? Wanneer mainstream commentatoren zich al deze vragen stellen komen ze niet verder dan een dooddoener als ‘globalisering’. Wolfgang Streeck probeert juist de bovenstaande vragen te beantwoorden en komt met een historische analyse over de diepere oorzaken van de huidige crisis. De losstaande feiten van de oorzaken waren voor mij niet nieuw, die had ik allemaal al eens ergens eerder gehoord. Maar Streeck plaatst het allemaal wel in een overtuigend narratief dat tot op zekere hoogte wel nieuw is. Het is ook een verhaal dat vrij makkelijk is over te brengen naar een groter publiek en dat ansich is erg waardevol.

Sociale vrede op krediet

Streeck richt zich op het democratisch kapitalisme van het ‘Westen’ en hoe de crisis steeds wordt uitgesteld. Hoewel een land als de Verenigde Staten vaak een voorhoede rol opneemt, is de onderliggende dynamiek in vrijwel alle Westerse landen hetzelfde, ook voor bijvoorbeeld de Scandinavische landen, zo illustreren de talloze grafieken en tabellen. Het verhaal begint met het ‘postwar settlement’ dat na de tweede wereldoorlog onder dreiging van het communisme totstand kwam kwam, met een interventionistische overheid die de markt disciplineerde en zorgde voor toenemende welvaart en voorzieningen, wat we dus het ‘democratisch kapitalisme’ zouden kunnen noemen. Dit leidde tot ongekende groei en welvaart, maar eind jaren ‘60 begon de economische groei terug te lopen. Werkers waren in de jaren ‘70 echter nog militant en bleven loonsverhogingen en stijgende voorzieningen eisen, waarmee het verdelingsconflict tussen wat Streeck ‘winstafhankelijken’ en ‘loonafhankelijken’ noemt weer op de voorgrond kwam. Hierop begon het Kapitaal investeringsmiddelen in te trekken. Om de sociale vrede te bewaren stuurden overheden aan op een monetair beleid dat groeiende lonen mogelijk bleef maken, met enorme inflatie tot gevolg. Mede dankzij de oliecrisis stagneerde de groei ondanks inflatie; met het zogenaamde ‘stagflation’ als gevolg.

Halverwege de jaren ‘70 begon het Kapitaal het neoliberale project van deregulering en liberalisering om daarmee de interveniërende overheid terug te dringen en de markt weer het primair economisch allocatiemechanisme te maken. Onder het voortouw van Reagan en Thatcher brak men met de inflatie door de te rente te verhogen met stijgende werkloosheid tot gevolg, wat op de langere termijn de kracht van vakbonden en stakingen verder ondermijnde. De sociale vrede werd vervolgens gekocht door de (schulden-)staat, overheden staken zich massaal in de schulden om te voldoen aan de sociale zekerheid (waarop door de hogere werkloosheid vaker een beroep opgedaan werd).

De kapitalistische vrede was hiermee echter tijdelijk en niet duurzaam verlengt. In de jaren ‘90 begonnen regeringen zich steeds drukker te maken over hun schuldenlasten en vroegen schuldeisers zich af of staten hun schulden nog wel terug konden betalen. Onder Clinton ging men ertoe over om de begroting weer sluitend te maken. De meeste andere Westerse landen volgden het voorbeeld van de Verenigde Staten, al dan niet tot de orde geroepen door het IMF of de OESO. Maar nog steeds moest de sociale vrede bewaard worden. Deze werd nu gekocht door de groei van particuliere schulden, door middel van krediet voor consumenten (de proliferatie van creditcards), maar ook door hypotheken. Dit hielp natuurlijk ook om consumptie te bevorderen en daarmee de gevaarlijke achteruitgang van vraag tegen te gaan. De particuliere schuldopbouw is de derde (en tot nog toe laatste) manier waarop de sociale vrede kunstmatig in stand gehouden wordt. De particuliere schuldenlast steeg niet alleen gigantisch in de Verenigde Staten en Groot Brittannië, maar dus ook in de Scandinavische landen.

Er is kortom al 40 jaar lang een telkens uitgestelde crisis van het democratisch kapitalisme. Inflatie, staatsschulden en particuliere schulden zijn de drie op elkaar volgende ingezette methodes geweest voor groei- en welvaartsillusies, waarmee steeds tijdelijk tijd werd gekocht. Het is sociale vrede op krediet geweest. Neoliberale hervormingen bepaalden ook de voorwaarden van alle drie overgangen, ten koste dus van de loonafhankelijke bevolking. Het einde van de inflatie was het begin van de tot de dag van vandaag aanhoudende structurele werkloosheid (en daarmee een gedeeltelijke verklaring voor de zwakte van de vakbonden). Vervolgens leidde het terugdringen van de overheidsschulden in de jaren ‘90 tot bezuinigingen en de privatisering van overheidsdiensten. En met de particuliere schuldopbouw zien we het verlies aan spaargeld, verdere bezuinigingen en een nieuwe generatie die opgroeit met schulden. De hervormingen van de afgelopen veertig jaar komen neer op een definitieve poging om de kapitalistische economie en de markt te bevrijden van de massademocratie die deel uit maakte van het postwar settlement. Het lijkt er nu op dat het kapitalisme het nu zonder vredesformule moet doen van het op krediet gefinancierd consumentisme. Continue reading

Changing the world with Hollowayism

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This is a book I have wanted to read for a long time. I am very interested in theories of social change. It is a tremendously important topic but one that is rarely discussed among the left and very much ignored in academia. John Holloway is one of those few authors that made a well-known contribution to the topic, but reading articles about and interviews with him, it always seemed Hollowayism is a perspective that I very much disagree with. That is why this book was on my to-read list for a long time: what better way to challenge your own perspective than to read something you think you very much disagree with. I still disagree with Holloway, but this is also one of the best books I have read in the last year.

It starts out brilliantly with the first two sentences, a paraphrasing of Goethe´s Faust: “In the beginning is the scream. We scream.” While you don’t realize it in the beginning, this already includes the main epistemological implications that are worked out in the rest of the book. The introduction is brilliant, it’s angry and not holding back:  ‘we need no promise of a happy ending to justify our rejection of a world we feel to be wrong’. While the book is quite complicated, with many difficult concepts being introduced and discussed, it is also written as accessible as one possibly could at this level of theoretical sophistication and still very poetic at times.

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Naomi Klein – This Changes Everything

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This is the first book of Naomi Klein that I have read. Of course I have known of Naomi Klein’s existence pretty much since I have been properly politicized many years ago. I just never got to read the books and thought there wasn’t that much new in it for me. I thought of her as a great introduction for the interested-but-not-yet-radical people out there and I obviously didn’t really need that introduction anymore. Watching the horrible Shock Doctrine documentary didn’t help, although I recently gathered that Naomi Klein distanced herself from that as well and hopes to do better with the This Changes Everything documentary that should come out in the near future. But I thought it would be a good idea to read this ‘classic’ (that’s what all Naomi Klein books become) while it was still fresh. Plus I never really read a book fully focused on climate change and had heard that this was Naomi Klein’s most radical book yet, including the subtitle ‘capitalism vs the climate’.

And I liked it a lot more than I expected. It is brilliantly researched (she has an entire team working for her) with tidbits and facts that were completely new for me. Actually, the entire geo-engineering topic was new for me, I didn’t know it even existed, let alone how seriously it is taken by some as a solution to climate change.

It is a movement book. It provides the frames and arguments for a movement to unite both the radicals and the progressives and gives them the ammunition to convince people and grow a movement. And I love the framing. It is divided in three parts. The first one sets out the problem; its massive scale and what will need to be done to save the world. The second part takes aim at the false solutions; those that are presented by big business, green billionaires and the big green NGOs, and how the latter are utterly corrupted (with the most shocking example of the Nature Conservancy drilling for oil in their own nature reserves), dismissing them and their freaky geo-engineering techno-fixes as magical thinking. And then in the third part she sort of sets out a strategy, with the anti-extractivist movement of Blockadia fighting off new pipelines and extraction projects, the divestment campaign and the potential to delegitimize the fossil-fuel industry, the legal and moral challenges for industry from indigenous peoples, all in all coming to a conclusion where she compares the movement necessary to combat climate change with the abolition movement against slavery.

I love the framing. It has a lot of frames, small and big, words and metaphors (‘sacrifice zones’, fossilized resources as ‘decayed remnants of long-dead life-forms’, extraction as ‘grave digging’). Just look at this quote:

“Given this legacy, our task is not small, but it is simple: rather than a society of grave robbers, we need to become a society of life amplifiers, deriving our energy directly from the elements that sustain life. It’s time to let the dead rest.”

Beautiful right? And just like the term ‘shock doctrine’ has become common usage, some of this book’s metaphors are already popping up elsewhere.

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Sterilizing the City

yuppenterrasbaarsjes

In explaining people’s apathy in Northern European countries, many make the argument of how the ‘objective conditions’ are not ripe yet for massive protests, how things are simply not bad enough at the moment. This is bullshit. In the past there have been massive uprisings while things were objectively getting better. ’68 happened in a time of annual wage increases of 5-8% with new consumer goods that became affordable for the masses. Looking at the Netherlands, the ‘objective conditions’ are worse than in the ’80s. It has the most flexibilized labour market of continental Europe and unemployment rates are almost as bad as the worst in the ’80s. Besides that, being unemployed nowadays is a lot worse than in the past (getting benefits is a lot harder) and back then young people could decide to study an extra couple of years without being indebted for the rest of their lives.

But people have to know it. The average person doesn’t ‘feel’ the unemployment rate and the most flexibilized labour market. It has to be told. And it has to be told that it is really fucked up and that action has to be taken. Otherwise the average person will blame himself for being un(der)employed or will simply think of their part-time contract as normal. They will deal with their frustration individually rather than collectively. And that is exactly the problem currently. People turn to medication and self-help books rather than setting up action-committees.

There are many reasons for this individualization of collective problems. A major problem is that people simply are not being told. And when trade unions and leftist parties fail in producing a counter-hegemonic discourse of how fucked up things are and how things can be different through action, then it is up to the extra-parliamentary leftists to fulfill that task. And for a marginalized small group of people that is not backed by money or powerful connections, the easiest way to get your message across to a wider audience is by putting up posters and graffiti on the streets. But this is exactly something that is more and more repressed in many modern developed nations.

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Reflections on Violence – Georges Sorel

Georges Sorel (1847-1922)

Georges Sorel (1847-1922)

I ended up reading this book when I found it in a give-away library in one of Amsterdam’s social centers. I had heard of the book before, it’s one of those influential classics that probably almost nobody reads. As I’m quite interested in the question of violence for achieving social change, Sorel’s book on the functions of violence seemed relevant. Plus Sorel wrote about the role of myths in converting and motivating people, which sounded quite intriguing. And also the fact that Georges Sorel was supposedly Benito Mussolini’s favourite philosopher actually made me only more curious.

Now after reading it seems to be a hard one to review. I do think it was certainly worth the effort of reading.  It is written in 1906, before the world wars and before the Bolshevik revolution, but it is still easy enough to follow, especially after reading up Wikipedia on the Dreyfus Affair and characters as Jaurès. Sorel is also rather convincing. In fact, I’m quite sure this book may have turned me into a syndicalist from one day to the other if I had read it somewhere between 1900 and1930, but the world has drastically changed and we live under completely different conditions now. Sadly, there are (for as far as I know) no books around now that would have such a convincing answer of what needs to be done in order to achieve lasting social change. For me, the struggle with this book is determining in which ways Sorel’s ideas and concepts can be made relevant to today’s world. Consider this review to be an attempt.

Let me first start by explaining why Sorel may have turned me into a revolutionary syndicalist before 1930. It is actually the purity of his revolutionary strategy that I really like. There is nothing like it today. The puritanism of Vaneigem seems just to be about following his own egoistic individual desires, while for Sorel there are also no compromises, but there is still a coherent strategy that is logically deduced from Marxist theory. It is the myth of the general strike that reflects the fundamental principles of Marxism. Firstly, it intuitively shows how society is divided into two antagonistic blocs, namely the proletariat (the producers) and the bourgeoisie. No philosophical explanation is necessary, the general strike makes all oppositions extraordinary clear. Secondly, it entails that rebellion is necessary for capitalism to disappear. Workers could be tempted to the capitalist order of things, through capitalist philanthropists and parliamentary socialist promises, but the myth of the general strike will keep them in a state of revolt, plus the class war perspective will prevent the masses from turning to other reactionary forms that could help them loose their anger. Thirdly, to partisans for the general strike, even the most popular social reforms will look silly. Finally, the brilliant thing is the anti-elitist implications. With the myth of the general strike there is no need for intellectuals thinking for the masses, no party line, no leaders.

“These results could not be produced in any very certain manner by the use of ordinary language; use must be made of a body of images which, by intuition alone, and before any considered analyses are made, is capable of evoking as an undivided whole the mass of sentiments which corresponds to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modem society. The Syndicalists solve this problem perfectly, by concentrating the whole of Socialism in the drama of the general strike; there is thus no longer any place for the reconciliation of contraries in the equivocations of the professors; everything is clearly mapped out, so that only one interpretation of Socialism is possible. This method has all the advantages which “integral” knowledge has over analysis, according to the doctrine of Bergson.”

A problem for relating Sorel’s myth of the general strike to the Netherlands in 2013 is that for Sorel the proletariat is only the producers. And what Sorel in 1906 categorizes as producers does not include retailkeepers, and also not the foremen that are less likely to join the strike. I certainly don’t think that class analysis is no longer relevant. You can certainly still divide society into two antagonistic blocs, those who control the wealth and means of production and those who have no control over the means of production and have to work for a wage. But limiting the possibility for social change (through the general strike) to what Sorel uncompromisingly and narrowly defines as ‘producers’ is no longer relevant for 21st century developed nations. It’s hard to imagine how syndicalism on itself can lead to revolutionary change. As for the historical record, revolutionary syndicalism did have quite the impact and potential. Having recently read a bit on Gramsci’s involvement in post-WW1 Italy, Turin was a hotbed of lengthy general strikes that were beyond control of the Italian Socialist Party (and subsequent Communist Party) or intellectuals that wanted to think for the masses. Similar events transpired all over Europe. But everywhere, they were in fact beaten down by the freikorps and similar paramilitary fascist organizations. It seems that the myth of the general strike and proletarian violence was not enough for the producers to actually win the revolution. Unfortunately, if we look in history (with some exceptions) it seems that labour militancy at best achieved social reforms and led to fascist reaction every time the masses demanded more than just a piece of the cake.

Fiat factory occupation in Turin in 1920

Fiat factory occupation in Turin in 1920

Now let’s progress to the question of violence. It is first worthwhile to remark that Sorel makes a distinction between violence and force. Force is what the governing minority uses to impose the social order, violence are the acts of revolt to destroy that order. He then notes how violence is also useful for parliamentary socialism. Without exceptional circumstances created by striking and rioting, the parliamentary power of socialists is reduced. It is in these exceptional circumstances that parliamentary socialists (/social-democrats) take up the role of peace-makers, scare the middle-classes into conceding reforms to restore order. Also without the consent of socialist leaders*, “[workers] endeavour to intimidate the prefects by popular demonstrations which might lead to serious conflicts with the police, and they commend violence as the most efficacious means of obtaining concessions. At the end of a certain time the obsessed and frightened administration nearly always intervenes with the masters and forces an agreement upon them, which becomes an encouragement to the propagandists of violence. ”

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The Revolution of Everyday Life – Raoul Vaneigem

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I have had this on my to-read list for years. This is the first Situationist text that I have read and its influence is obvious, while reading it I recognized a lot that I had seen before in other cultural artefacts that came after it, from punk bands as Crass with which I sort of grew up to anarchist and political zines I’ve read over the years. As with everything, it’s good to finally read the original. It is also good read one of the main ’68 texts yourself rather than just the usual historically appropriated accounts of what it was all about. With the events May ’68 in your mind, it’s crazy to see to what extent writers like Vaneigem sort of expected something along those lines to happen. But it is also shocking to see to what extent we have actually regressed in achieving the radical changes Vaneigem envisioned.

The foundation of Vaneigem’s theory was to me surprisingly orthodox Marxist. Most of his account of history is basically the same as the one you can find in the communist manifesto. The bourgeoisie superseded the feudal system, which enabled capitalism and the creation of the proletariat. But the dominance of the bourgeoisie is only a transitional phase in the development of humanity, as the very same capitalism that they created allowed for the progress in productive forces and technology which will allow the proletariat to take over and finally actualize the egalitarian visions. The main thing that Vaneigem and the Situationists add is that it is not just about material conditions, which in the rich industrialized countries took the proletariat beyond the struggle of survival, it is the poverty of everyday life. The poverty of choice offered by our shallow consumer society, the lack of imagination, the alienation, and that all the liberal freedoms offered are a sham. “Anyone who talks about revolution and class struggle without referring explicitly to everyday life – without grasping what is subversive about love and positive in the refusal of constraints – has a corpse in his mouth”. According to Vaneigem, we’re past the struggle of survival, as in many parts of the world we have achieved a decent enough standard of material well-being. We’ve got our fridges and televisions. Now we want to live, not just survive. He loathes the work-ethic that was (and to a smaller extent still is) a big part of the Left, in for example the right-to-work campaigns and simplistic narrowing of class struggle to wage-bargaining. He reminds that the Latin word for labour means suffering. “Today the love of a job well done and belief in the rewards of hard work signal nothing so much as spineless and stupid submission”.

May-68

It is easy to see the appeal of all this, it´s not material poverty that pisses off young radicals in the ‘rich West’, it is this poverty of everyday life that makes us want to throw bricks at the cops. Vaneigem wants to give free reign to subjectivity, to our individual desires to live intensely. The theory he sets out is logical and coherent, but to me ultimately unsatisfying. You can write of the ‘rich West’ all you like, and we’re still free from the risk of starvation, but what’s left of the fat Keynesian-Fordist welfare state? This radical critique written in the heydays of welfare state capitalism made me angry. Angry at the so-called ‘social-democrats’ that have been destroying the welfare state, our social security, social housing, labour rights, healthcare-system and public services, by completely giving into neoliberal reforms. But also angry at Vaneigem, that constantly belittles all the achievements of that welfare state that was once ours, and which was achieved by socialist parties, through trade-union organizing, and militant leftists of all these ‘-isms’ that he loathes (Socialism, Stalinism, Trotskyism, Maoism etc). I wish we still had expanding welfare state with its annual wage increases that he bemoans. I am not saying that we should go back to the welfare state of the past and leave it at that, far from it, I completely support Vaneigem’s analysis of the poverty of everyday life, but I think that the revolution required to overthrow it is much more probable with the leftist militantism of the 60s and 70s that he despises still around.

What it basically comes down to is that I detest the puritanism of it all. This puritanism is present in Vaneigem´s writing and also in many other anarchist writings. He is against all kinds of hierarchy, against all kinds of reform and against any kind of sacrifice, as your actions should always come from your own true inner self (what is this true inner self anyway and how can we know?*), never from an “ideology” or leader. Never cooperate with more ‘reformist’ organizations. No mass organizations. Only self-managed communities and small radical cells. “I have already said that the confused conflict between so-called progressives and reactionaries comes down to the issue whether people should be broken by the carrot or the stick”. No nuance seems to be possible for Vaneigem, all reform is reactionary. “I want to live intensely, for myself, grasping every pleasure firm in the knowledge that what is radically good for me will be good for everyone.” Alright, it’s fine if you want to have fun in your actions towards social change and revolution, but don’t fucking belittle all those other people that work fucking hard for social change in different ways, because you’re whole theory is only rationalizing your own selfish ego by pretending everything will change because you and some others are “intensely following their inner desires”. If you don’t want work hard improving the political consciousness of the ‘masses’, then don’t, but fuck off belittling those who do. I mean, get real, politics is dirty. If you’re truly serious about achieving social change** then prepare to get your hands dirty and know that some foul Machiavellian shit needs to be pulled off by someone somewhere sooner or later.

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The problem is that Vaneigem lacks a theory for social change. Vaneigem explicitly does not want to write a “what is to be done” step-guide towards revolution ala Lenin, but the question of how you want to achieve the social change towards a radically different system remains. Without it, what remains is merely an intellectual legitimation for petty violence, vandalism and shoplifting. There are never enough of those of course, but still. The system is not scared of you living out your “true inner desires”. Vaneigem’s idea is that everyone’s harmonized individual perspectives will successfully construct a new coherent and collective world. But how do you get there? Vaneigem expected that people were fed up and would soon collectively live out their subjectivity, but this simply never really ended up happening, perhaps except for a month in ´68. In the last chapters Vaneigem becomes a bit clearer on what the revolutionary approach ought to be. “Each phase of the revolutionary process is a faithful reflection of the ultimate goal.” Prefigurative politics it is I suppose.

I hoped that the part on culture, the spectacle, and how capitalism and the commodity form corrupts culture and leisure time would inspire me, but after reading the brilliant Culture Industry essays last year this part wasn’t much more than an Adorno-for-5-year-olds. I was quite curious about the part on sexuality, but the whole Wilhelm Reich fetish is weird to me and seems and typical 60s. Then there’s Vaneigem loathing the moralism of many leftist side-issue struggles and he beats up the anti-racist and anti-antisemetic hobbyhorses of the Left (“we’re all just niggers to the rulers of this land” to quote Crass) which is entertaining, but I am not sure whether I agree.
There were some parts that I really liked though. It is filled with a vast array of highly quotable sentences. Besides, I found the conceptualizations of roles, specialists, stereotypes and power actually rather insightful. On the masochistic nature of humans in their everyday life for instance:

“Consider a thirty-five-year-old man. Each morning he starts his car, drives to the office, pushes papers, has lunch in town, plays poker, pushes more papers, leaves work, has a couple of drinks, goes home, greets his wife, kisses his children, eats a steak in front of the TV, goes to bed, makes love and falls asleep. Who reduces a man’s life to this pathetic sequence of clichés? A journalist? A cop? A market researcher? A populist author? Not at all. He does it himself, breaking his day down into a series of poses chosen more or less unconsciously from the range of prevalent stereotypes.”
[..]
“The satisfaction of a well-played role is fuelled by his eagerness to remain at a distance from himself, to deny and sacrifice himself”
“We live our roles better than our own lives”

Alienation Is Not Quantifiable. By Kommunist Sex Klub: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Kommunist-Sex-Klub/

Alienation Is Not Quantifiable. By Kommunist Sex Klub: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Kommunist-Sex-Klub/

 

And on power:

“Slaves are not willing slaves for long if they are not compensated for their submission with a shred of authority”

“There is no Power without submission”

“Power is partial, not absolute”.

His concept of Power is vague and abstract, but you do get a sense of what he means. I like the insight that those that climb the ladder, the specialists, subject themselves to Power the most. The specialists are the masters-as-slaves. The more they climb the hierarchy, the more Power, but also the more restricted on what they can do with this Power. I do sort of agree here, changing the system from within by climbing the system’s hierarchy most of the time does not work at all. Vaneigem expected the proletariat to collectively rise and live out their subjectivity. To let us all become masters-without-slaves. Sadly, WE’RE STILL WAITING. Anyway. Let’s end this critique with the spectacle of some more brilliant Vaneigem quotes.

“The millions of humans being shot, imprisoned, tortured, starved, brutalized and systematically humiliated must surely be at peace, in their cemeteries and mass graves, to know how history has made sure that the struggle in which they died has enabled their descendants, isolated in their air-conditioned apartments, to learn from their daily dose of TV how to repeat that they are happy and free”

“To consume is to be consumed by inauthenticity, nurturing appearances to the benefit of the spectacle and the detriment of real life”

“Whatever you possess possesses you in return. Everything that makes you into an owner adapts you to the order of things”

“the feeling of humiliation is simply the feeling of being an object”

“the abstract, alienating mediation that estranges me from myself is terribly concrete”

* Vaneigem is also not going to convince me that he wrote all these books and read even more out of a “pure inner desire to live intensely”) I mean, everyone seeks to rationalize their own behaviour, but nobody truly knows why we do what we do. I just do not believe in some sort of repressed pure inner desire that exists somewhere in all of us.
** It’s kind of typical of this day and age that I say social change rather than revolution. The word revolution simply isn’t part of me and many other’s vocabulary as it seems too far away.

The Great Transformation – Polanyi

Where should one begin in reviewing a classic like this one? It was always recommended to me as a forgotten classic, a great critique of markets, ignored by the mainstream, and highly relevant to our times despite being over 60 years old. And relevant it is; it is a great assault on the idea of self-regulating markets, an idea that sadly still seems to inform most of today’s mainstream discourse. There is some uncanny resemblance between the events Polanyi writes about and many of the things still going on in our own neoliberal era. Furthermore, this book is also about the break-down of the market society and its collapse into the Great Depression, which makes it even more relevant considering today’s crisis of capitalism.

The Great Transformation is a work that combines several disciplinary fields of the social sciences which ought not to be separated: anthropology, sociology, history, (political) economy and political science. It’s all in there. Polanyi gives a history of the emergence of the market economy and its social implications. Its greatest strength and what makes it so uniquely different from other books is its rediscovery of society. Society is the perspective taken, rather than for example class (which is dismissed as crude Marxist dogma by Polanyi). When explaining the social dislocations from imposing the market economy, it’s society that suffers and consequently brings forth its reaction. Markets did not naturally evolve or start out of individual acts of barter (NO, people did not barter in ancient societies, anthropologists never found a single society to do so out of the thousands that have been researched). Markets were actually imposed on the people by government intervention from the very beginning. History shows that regulation and markets grew up together, but it was the idea of the self-regulating market that found ground during the Industrial Revolution was a complete reversal of this trend.

In the ‘ideal type’ market economy all production is for sale on the market and all incomes derive from these sales. This means that markets are there for all elements of industry, not just goods, but also for labor, land and money. Interest is the price for money and it’s the income for those that are able to provide it (the financiers); rent is the price for the use of land and also the income for those who supply it (the property-owners); wages are the price for the use of labor and the income for those who sell it (the workers). The market economy assumes that supply at a definite price will equal the demand. Production and distribution depend on prices, for prices form the income that ensure the distribution. The brilliant insight here is of course the recognition of Polanyi that land, labor and money, despite being subjected to the market, are obviously no commodities; they are not produced for sale! That is why Polanyi refers to them as fictitious commodities. The commodity description is entirely fictitious, but this fiction is used to organize them. They are being bought and sold on the market; their price depending on supply and demand. All this to enable the self-regulating market.

A market economy, in which the economic system is controlled, regulated and directed by markets alone, exists only in a market society. As when land and labor are being turned into commodities, it is society itself that is being subordinated to the market. This was utterly new and beyond people’s imagination before the Industrial Revolution. Mercantalism, with all its tendency towards commercialization, never attacked the safeguards which protected these two basic elements of production -land and labor- from becoming the objects of commerce. For the market society to work, the homo economicus had to appear, the idea that human’s primary motive is to maximize gain. But the early laborer could not be lured into the factory, as he did not feel compelled to make as much money as he could, where he felt degraded by the work. Only the threat of corporal punishment and starvation, not the allure of high wages, would make him sell his labor on the market. The masses first had to be pauperized and forced off the lands before a labor market could come into being. As Polanyi argues, it is much more social status than monetary gain that humans crave.

“Now, what the white man may still occasionally practice in remote regions today, namely, the smashing up of social structures in order to extract the element of labor from them, was done in the eighteenth century to white populations by white men for similar purposes. Hobbes’ grotesque vision of the State –a human Leviathan whose vast body was made up of an infinite number of human bodies- was dwarfed by the Ricardian construct of the labor market: a flow of human lives the supply of which was regulated by the amount of food put at their disposal.”

In rewriting the history of the Industrial Revolution and the establishment of the market society, Polanyi comes up with a highly interesting account of all the contradictions coming out of obscure laws in England at that time. Nobody truly understood the reasons for poverty at that time, often going for morality tales like Hannah More’s Christian suffering (blaming it on drinking tea was common as well!), the connection between a higher total trade and unemployment wasn’t seen. The intellectuals at that time believed the more poor people there were, the more wealth as well. The Speenhamland laws led to a market economy without a labour market and no reliable statistics. It was during this time of confusion that economic theory was founded.

The discovery of economics was astounding. Interestingly enough, back then it was natural science that gained in prestige by its connection to social science (instead of vice-versa!). The triumphs of natural science had been merely theoretical and were of no practical importance, while the discovery of economics critically hastened the great transformation and the establishment of the market society. The creators of machines were mere uneducated artisans who often could barely read or write.

Because of the overall confusion the great minds did not really understand capitalism and many came up with the dues ex machine of Nature, with the most well-known example the Malthussian law of population. They thought of economic society as subjected to laws from Nature rather than human-made laws. Ricardo combined the naturalistic and the humanistic, with the laborer being the only force to create economic value in his theory of value (mistakingly adhered to by Marx according to Polanyi), who was then again subjected by the self-regulating market that followed the inexorable laws of Nature. Polanyi puts the proto-socialist Robert Owen forward as the only person who saw the meaning of it all. He understood that what appeared to be as an economic problem was in fact a social one. In economic terms the worker was certainly exploited and did not receive a fair exchange. But in spite of exploitation, it was the massive social dislocations, degradation and misery that was truly problematic. And here Owen rightly called for legislative interference against the devastating forces from the self-regulating market.

“My life was not useless; I gave important truths to the world, and it was only for want of understanding that they were disregarded. I have been ahead of my time.” – Deathbed statement (November 1858), in response to a church minister who asked if he regretted wasting his life on fruitless projects

But at that time the dominant intellectuals thought differently. The word laissez-faire may come from France in the mid 18th century, it was only in the 1820s that it began to stand for its three classical tenets: for a labor market, the gold standard and free trade. Economic liberalism became a secular religion: “Born as a mere penchant for non-bureaucratic methods, it evolved into a veritable faith in a man’s secular salvation through a self-regulating market”. It is no coincidence that Adam Smith’s constantly quoted “invisible hand” has such a divine connotation. Laissez-faire became a secular faith that was pursued with evangelical fervor in order to make the market economy reality. In the 1830s it suddenly became policy, the 1832 reform created a free labor market, the gold standard became the automatic steering mechanism, and England started to depend on food from overseas sources. Under the self-regulating market the most productive and inventive would be able to survive and the British believed their factories would be able undersell to the rest of the world. This also meant the expansion of the market system on a world scale powered by the might of the British Navy.

But there was nothing natural about laissez-faire. It was enforced by the state, which required enormous increases of centralized legislation, control and intervention to introduce free markets. Furthermore, freedom of contract is not a principle of noninterference as liberals argue; it destroys noncontractual relations between individuals, it imposes atomistic individualistic organization on societies. Laissez-faire was not a method to achieve a thing, it was the thing to be achieved. Paradoxically, the philosophy that demanded the restriction of state activities and intervention, could not but entrust the same state with the new powers and instruments in order to establish laissez-faire. If laissez-faire means the opposite of interventionism, how then can laissez-faire claim to be laissez-faire? And ironically enough, while laissez-faire was planned, the counter-movement against laissez-faire was not. While laissez-faire was utopian, that what Polanyi calls the ‘double movement’ was spontaneous and pragmatic and became successful in the 1860s in protecting a broad range of vital social interests against the expanding market. Liberal economists as Mises, Spencer, Summer and Lippmann have a mistaken interpretation for this double movement, explaining it on impatience, greed and shortsightedness. These writers blame the rise of socialism and nationalism for frustrating economic liberty and they often point to trade unions, Marxist intellectuals, greedy manufacturers and reactionary landlords as the villains in their narrative.

Polanyi also connects the emergence of the market society and the subsequent double movement with colonial expansionism. There was a time that even the tories considered colonies to be a waste, but after the double movement caused protectionism, countries ´irrationally´ stopped trading with each other as much and instead started ´trading´ with the overseas market. As a result the colonial population was subjected to the same kind of social dislocation as the British people were earlier. The introduction of market organization of land and labour broke up the village life and subsistence living. This -much more than the mere brutal economic exploitation- caused massive famines in for example India. And colonial societies were even less capable of protecting themselves against the market forces than the British peasantry.

His discussion of the Great Depression and the Gold Standard is of great contemporary relevance. There are many similarities here with the current crisis and the adherence to euro. The European elites are doing everything they can to keep inflation low and maintain the euro while simultaneously imposing austerity and social misery upon the periphery, disregarding the democratic wishes of the people there with more and more technocratic rule. And just as liberal economic theory in Polanyi´s time ignored country differences and their trade imbalances, putting Great Britain on the same rank and footing as Denmark or Guatemala, the creators of the European single market and monetary union conveniently failed to see problems that would come out of a monetary union without fiscal and political union (despite being warned by plenty of people that saw it coming).

Also relevant is his discussion of constitutionalism, which changed in meaning during the demand for popular democracy by the Chartist movement. The Chartists threatened to stop the satanic mills of the market economy during the massive social dislocation of the emerging market society and were violently put down by the authorities. A hundred years earlier Locke´s constitutional safeguards were meant to protect commercial property against arbitrary acts from above (the Crown), but now constitutional safeguards were put in place to protect industrial property from the people. The separation of power that constitutionalism entails was now to separate people from power of their economic lives. The American constitution that put private property under the highest conceivable protection created the first legally grounded market society in the world, where people, in spite of universal suffrage, are powerless against the owners. In our current globalized market society we have what could be called the new constitutionalism (coined by Stephen Gill) in which political-economic structures are shielded from democratic rule and popular accountability in order to grant privileged rights to corporate capital and large investors. The European Monetary Union is a prime example of the new constitutionalism and the soon-to-be implemented fiscal pact will be an escalation in sacrificing democratic participation on macro-economic policy in favor of imposing automatic austerity on the member-states.

Following the new constitutionalism, Polanyi´s discussion of fascism serves as a warning for European’s ongoing malaise: “The stubbornness with which economic liberals, for a critical decade, had, in the service of deflationary policies, supported authoritarian interventionism, merely resulted in a decisive weakening of democratic forces which might otherwise have averted the fascist catastrophe”. The European elites, with their constant separation of economics from popular accountability, with their constant assault on the welfare state, and with their disregard for the democratic wishes of people in the periphery, are very likely to underestimate the social forces they are slowly unleashing by the social misery they impose on the people. The scenes of Golden Dawn mobs beating up immigrants and leftists in Greece, while police look the other way, should speak volumes for the need to heed Polanyi´s warning. To Polanyi the success of fascism in the 1930s is best explained by the failings of the market system. It had nothing to do with local causes, national mentalities, historical backgrounds, it sprang up everywhere. Many fascist movements were in fact non-nationalist. One should actually not speak of a fascist ‘movement’, as fascism relied upon the goodwill of people in high positions rather than popular masses; nowhere fascists took power by an actual revolution, it was always no more than a sham rebellion that had tacit approval of the authorities that pretended to be overwhelmed by force. Between ´24 and ´29 fascism faded away as the market system seemed ensured, but after the crisis in 1930 fascism became a world power in just a few years.

Polanyi considers the victory of fascism to be the result of the liberal’s simple-minded idea of freedom that sees any control or planning to be a denial of freedom. Freedom then degenerates into a mere advocacy for free enterprise, which is reduced into a fiction by the hard reality of giant trusts and monopolies. His last chapter on freedom in a complex society seems like preliminarily answer to the arguments found in Milton Friedman’s Capital and Freedom 18 years later. Without regulation freedom is only freedom for the few. Liberals believe in an illusionary idea of freedom that denies the reality of society, as if all power and compulsion is gone when we engage in contractual relationships in the market economy as individuals. The fascists are the response to the failings of the market economy; they relinquish freedom and glorify power which is the reality of society. It is then up to the socialist to accept the harsh reality of society, but to defend freedom in spite of it, as Polanyi concludes: “Uncomplaining acceptance of the reality of society gives man indomitable courage and strength to remove all removable injustice and unfreedom. As long as he is true to his task of creating more abundant freedom for all, he need not fear that either power or planning will turn against him and destroy the freedom he is building by their instrumentality. This is the meaning of freedom in a complex society; it gives us all the certainty that we need.”

Now 68 years later the word freedom continues to be abused as a simple-minded justification for markets. In our current neoliberal era market-oriented solutions are put forward to every problem. Whenever a government is unable to balance its budget, it often sells one of the tasks it used to fulfill off to the market. Essential parts of the modern welfare state like healthcare, education, housing, are increasingly subject to market forces. But also for credit (see the deregulation of the financial sector – the market knows best) and even for climate change (see cap and trade, CDM, REDD etc) markets are forwarded as the solution. Paradoxically, the solution is in fact the problem. Just as in the old times Polanyi writes of, the technocrats separate society into an economic and a political sphere, and attempt to solve (fundamentally highly political) social problems with ‘depoliticized’ technical solutions. The markets are seen as neutral arbitrators that will lead to a natural and objective equilibrium. Of course, it is not just ideology, turning something into a market is also the politically convenient way out that does not impede on powerful interests.

But to Polanyi markets in themselves are not a problem. It is the self-regulating market that is problematic, as upholding the commodity fiction threatens society and human life.  When the commodity fiction is abandoned and labor, land and money are no longer treated as commodities on the market, then the market can, even in principle, no longer be self-regulating. But the end of the self-regulating market and the market society does not mean the end of markets, as they should continue to ensure consumer freedom, to indicate the shifting of demand, to influence producer’s income, and serve as an instrument of accountancy. Here Polanyi, who self-identifies as a socialist, distinguishes himself from many leftists and Marxists that do want to abolish all markets. Polanyi in this day and age seems to be more some kind of radical social-democrat, who looks to reform society by regulation and planning that increases the freedom of all and always protects the individual’s right to nonconformity.

One could wonder how dismissive Polanyi is of Marxism. He did read Marx and accepts the exploitation of the worker in the capitalist system as a given. The most important difference between the two may be one of perspective. To Polanyi it is much more the massive social dislocation from imposing the market society (especially during the phase that Marx would call ‘primitive accumulation’) rather than the purely ‘economic’ exploitation of the worker creating more value than he earns that is important. Instead of the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, Polanyi opts for the less antagonistic perspective of society as a whole (the working, middle and landed classes) protecting its general interest against the brutality of the market. The narrative he sets out to defend this perspective is convincing. He faults the ‘economic determinism’ that misses out on society. On Ricardo’s labor theory of value he writes for example: “In a mistaken theorem of tremendous scope he invested labor with the sole capacity of constituting value, thereby reducing all conceivable transactions in economic society to the principle of equal exchange in a society of free men”. Marx adhered to Ricardo’s labor theory of value but added that it was not an equal exchange in a society of free men, but that the laborer was in fact exploited by the capitalist. I am guessing that the problem for Polanyi here might be that this theory of value, be it Marx´s or Ricardo´s, is too individualistic and atomistic, excluding other forms of economic organization, like for example communal. To Polanyi the main problem is of course not the worker being exploited (better to be exploited than not to be exploited at all), but the social dislocations that come out of the establishment of the market society.

Rather than arguing for one perspective or the other it may be best to conclude that one sees different things by using a different lenses and that both perspectives having their uses. I do however think that right-out dismissal of the ‘economic determinism’ of Marxism and other theories is mistaken. He does in fact lack a convincing explanation for the Great Depression. Polanyi looks at failings of the market system and the subsequent double movement, he kind of seems to argue that protectionism then led to the Great Depression, but it remains rather unclear. He certainly does not look or have any kind of explanation for the boom-bust cycle of capitalism and why the markets ‘failed’ at this or that particular time. His dismissal of other theories as the falling rate of profit, underconsumption or overproduction is therefore rather inappropriate.

Een voet tussen de deur (Dutch book review)

Eric Duivenoorden, zelf vroeger kraker in de Staatsliedenbuurt, beschrijft in negen hoofdstukken in grotendeels chronologische volgorde de geschiedenis van de kraakbeweging in Nederland. Amsterdam is hiervoor natuurlijk het hoofdtoneel, maar ook Nijmegen, Utrecht, Haarlem en Groningen komen voorbij. Hij legt de verschillen tussen de kraak-generaties uit een. De eersten in de jaren 60 zijn meestal jonge families, die klandestien panden die gepland staan voor de sloop maar jarenlang blijven leegstaan bewonen. In de jaren 70 verspreid het kraken zich rap en wordt het steeds meer een vorm van politieke actie tegen leegstand, het falende woonbeleid, en idiote stadsvernieuwingsplannen.

Toendertijd wou de Amsterdamse gemeente kantoren in de binnenstad neerzetten, de ring uitbreiden door het centrum, en vele oude wijken platgooien om metro-lijnen aan te brengen. Gelukkig is mede door kraak-acties dit grotendeels tegengehouden, alhoewel de oude Jodenbuurt wel is  platgegooid en Amsterdam tegenwoordig een spuuglelijk groot stadhuis heeft op grond waar vroeger mooie oude panden stonden (hadden ze niet beter dat grote lege huis op de Dam kunnen terugclaimen voor Amsterdam van die éne familie die het op illegale manier verkregen heeft?).

In de jaren 80 veranderde kraken van een maatschappelijke actie over volkshuisvesting steeds meer in een radicale manier van leven tegen ‘het systeem’. Eric Duivenoorden beschrijft deze kraakideologie als volgt samen: ‘Het enige wat de krakers zeker weten is wat zij niet willen. Waar dat eigenmachtige lot uiteindelijk toe moet leiden, is geen vraag die de doorsneekraker bezighoudt.’ Dus tegen de moderne consumptie-maatschappij en burgerlijk carrière maken. Hoewel het voor de meerderheid van de tienduizenden krakers het nog steeds gewoon om goedkope huisvesting ging, kwam er ook steeds meer een parallelle scene waar elk deel van het moderne stadsleven zijn eigen anti-commerciële tegenhanger kreeg, met restaurants/voku’s, ateliers, garage/winkels, theaters, cinemas, kinderopvang enzovoort. Deze parallelle scene opgebouwd in de jaren ’80, alhoewel kleiner dan toen, bestaat nog steeds, en veel van toen is nu gelegaliseerd/geinstitutionaliseert.

Verder omschrijft Duivenoorden hoe de kraakbeweging na zijn het hoogtepunt met de grote straatgevechten en het kroningsoproer van begin jaren 80 steeds kleiner en radicaler wordt met als eindpunt de reeks aanslagen van RaRa. Het laatste hoofdstuk geldt als een soort evaluatie, waar de teruggang van kraken in de jaren ’90 behandeld. Zo beweert hij dat de vele problemen rond (jongeren-)huisvesting een stuk minder zijn geworden, maar dat zolang er ‘louche huisjesmelkers en andere nietsontziende projectontwikkelaars’ zijn zal kraken een functie hebben.

Tram in de fik na ontruiming Lucky Luijk, oktober 1982

Misschien zijn Duivenoorden’s conclusies zo nu en dan iets te optimistisch. De problemen mogen dan veranderd zijn, in plaats van dat gezinnen de binnensteden probeerden te verlaten zijn de prijzen er daar juist nu zo ontzettend gestegen dat ze vaak ontoegankelijk worden voor de lagere inkomens. Woning leegstand mag dan minder zijn dan in de jaren ’80, er staat nu wel alleen al in de regio Amsterdam meer dan 2 miljoen vierkante meter kantoorruimte leeg door de crisis en vastgoed-bubbel. Daarnaast is er een behoorlijke crisis op de Nederlandse woning-‘markt’ en zijn sociale woningbouw corporaties schandalig bezig en veranderen sociale huurwoningen steevast in luxe koop appartementen. Oude volkswijken zoals de Pijp en de Jordaan zijn al volledig veryupt en gentrificatie slaat overal binnen de ring toe.

Interessant is wel zijn discussie over culturele broedplaatsen, hoe de gemeente er eind jaren ’90 achterkwam dat het ontruimen van al die kraakpanden met hun alternatieve scene er ook voor zorgt dat er van de stad weinig meer overblijft dan een leeg consumptie paradijs. Duivenoorden juicht het culturele broedplaatsen beleid toe en stelt dat het één van de resultaten van kraken is, en daarmee nu ook één van de redenen voor de terugval van de kraakbeweging. Ik zou alleen wel wat kritischer over deze culturele broedplaatsen zijn. Legalisatie is natuurlijk ook co-optatie. Alle regeltjes hebben een depoliticiserend effect, het wordt minder relevant, en kunstenaars veranderen in ‘creatieve ondernemers’. Culturele broedplaatsen kunnen nooit dat wat is neergezet door krakers vervangen.

Sterk is daarentegen zijn argument over hoe de disciplinering van de jeugd leidt tot een kleinere toewas van krakers. Soms wordt er geklaagd dat er tegenwoordig weinig maatschappelijke betrokkenheid is vergeleken vroegere generaties, maar studenten en scholieren zitten nu in een veel steviger keurslijf door allerlei veranderingen in de laatste 30 jaar. Toen kon een 18 jarige nog een uitkering krijgen of jarenlang studeren met een doorgaande beurs, nu worden studenten bedreigd met een langstudeerboete als ze een jaartje langer bezig zijn en zijn  de studentenschulden sterk gestegen. Natuurlijk is er ook een culturele verandering, een sterke individualisering onder het neoliberalisme, met jongeren die vanaf de middelbare school al druk bezig zijn met hun carrière (een paar jaren kraken staat niet goed op je cv), maar dit is tot op zekere hoogte ook een rationalisatie van veranderende omstandigheden. Hoewel het wel tragisch is hoe jongeren in de jaren ’80 het idee hadden dat ze een ‘no future’ generatie waren, terwijl dit voor de huidige generatie nog veel meer het geval is met het failliet van het westers economisch model en een crisis die alleen maar erger gaat worden. Men is zich er alleen nog niet zo bewust van.

Wat ik miste in dit boek was de internationale dimensie. Het krakers symbool van de cirkel met de bliksemschicht is bijvoorbeeld bedacht in Nederland (alhoewel overgenomen van weggeloopte slaven en daklozen in de VS die het achterlieten voor toekomstige reizigers om ze te laten weten of de eigenaar van een stuk grond goedgezind of niet), maar tegenwoordig zijn daar meer van buiten dan binnen Nederland op de muren gespoten.In het boek wordt er af en toe wel gerefereerd naar solidariteitsdemo’s in of voor het buitenland, maar de spreiding van krakerscultuur en de verschillen tussen landen had toch wel even behandelt kunnen worden.

Net als Duivenoorden vind ik de discussie van hoe je kraken moet duiden als middel van protest interessant. De recensie van Marja Pruis in de Groene was behoorlijk kritisch over wat de kraakbeweging nu wel bereikt heeft en beweert dat The Ex (geniale band!) eigenlijk het enige is dat zich nog altijd doorontwikkeld. Maar dit is wel erg cynisch. Ik denk dat allerlei kraakiniatieven, door te laten zien dat er buiten de  dagelijkse commerciële drab een andere manier van leven mogelijk is, een grote positieve invloed hebben beoefend op grote groepen mensen en dat dit nog steeds doorgaat (op een wat lagere schaal dan in de jaren ’80). Maar die discussie over effectiviteit en politieke strategie is wel een interessante. Want wat heeft die meest radicaal gepolitiseerde Nederlandse generatie ooit in het krakerstijdperk van de de jaren ’80 nou uiteindelijk bereikt?

Ook Duivenoorden omschrijft hoe de beweging van breedmaatschappelijke buurtstrijd over woningbeleid (vaak samen met andere progressieve bewegingen – inclusief de CPN) veranderde in steeds radicalere maar ook in zichzelf gekeerde politiek. Volgens mij kun je dit linken met een proces dat je ook in andere Westerse samenlevingen terugziet, dat de ’68 generatie met alle tegencultuur juist ook voor individualisering zorgde  (en daarmee onopzettelijk ook de neoliberalisering mogelijk maakte). Ik heb vaak het idee dat dit tot op zekere hoogte ook de de populariteit van anarchisme verklaart*, aangezien dit tegenwoordig wel de meest populaire radicale politieke ideologie is in het Westen in tegenstelling tot de oudere collectievere vormen van verzet. Anarchisten en krakers (na het kroningsoproer) hebben vaak moeite om de ‘gewone (hard!-)werkende mensen’ te betrekken in hun politiek activisme. Een interessante vergelijking kun je maken met de de oude socialistische bewegingen van voor de tweede wereldoorlog. Deze brede maatschappelijke organisaties hadden ook een soort ‘lifestyle politics’ met muziek-/sport-/kinder-/vrouwen-verengingen, theaters, met hun eigen optochten en manifestaties, maar dan toch met meer verbindingen naar de ‘massa’ en de ‘gewone mensen’ vergeleken de parallelle  scene van de krakers. Niet dat ik weet wat voor punt ik hier wil maken, maar het boek zette me hier wel aan het denken.

4 maart 1987, krakers demonstreren bij het Paleis van Justitie in Amsterdam tegen de Leegstandwet.

Het deed me ook denken aan al de tegenstrijdigheden en het dubbelzinnige. Tegen het systeem zijn, maar tegelijkertijd wel van stufi en bijstand profiteren. ‘Jullie rechtsorde, niet de onze’, maar tegelijkertijd wel alle mogelijke juridische trucs toepassen om maar in panden te kunnen blijven wonen. Radicale individuele vrijheid prediken, maar ook te vaak een verstikkende onvrijheid met vaak dezelfde kledingskeuzes en alles. Idealisme, maar soms ook wel egoïstisch eigenbelang. En juist ook kunnen bestaan omdat de progressievere elementen binnen ‘het systeem’ zich enigzins welwillend opstellen. Op de PVDA burgemeesters in Amsterdam wordt vaak terecht gescholden, maar het had er natuurlijk wel heel anders uitgezien als de VVD de burgemeesters van Amsterdam had geleverd.

Het bovenstaande is in ieder gevel geen argument tegen kraken, maar meer een argument om het niet alleen bij kraken te laten.

 

 

*Soms vraag ik me af of het er ook anders uit had gezien als bijvoorbeeld bands als de Rondos meer populair waren geweest dan Crass.

Europe and the crisis

Note: I have written the below for myself in order to make sense of the euro-crisis that I have been following over the last year. It is basically a long summary of the different perspectives and theories that for me made the most sense. Writing them out allowed me to process it and put out my own thoughts in a somewhat coherent way. If other people get something out of it by reading; great. I would of course be glad to hear criticism/feedback or whatever.

The Eurocrisis

It is maddening. The amount of bullshit that you hear. The constantly repeated myths of lazy Greeks and profligate South-European governments. The unquestioned acceptance for the need of austerity. The Dutch media implying that staying within the EU mandated 3% government deficit is in the national interest. Suggesting that failing to do so will put “our children” and future generations at risk. Dismissing  anyone who disagrees with that as a populist similar to Geert Wilders. And the fiscal pact that is about to be ratified is left undiscussed. And now also with Christine Lagarde offensively suggesting the problem is that common Greeks are not paying their taxes and that they should not whine as the little kids in Niger suffer so much more. Oh yes, of course, the IMF has done so much to help the little kids in Niger. Rather than blaming Greeks or profligate governments and being all moralistic about paying taxes and spending, it is important to make sense of the structural problems that are inherent in the eurocrisis.

And most of it is really not that difficult. Lets start with Greece. Greece is in the worst position obviously, but I can promise you that if it weren’t for Greece, the financial markets would be ganging up on another European country. Merkel and co now seems to believe that they may be able to get Greece safely out of the eurozone without the whole thing collapsing and to then just wait it out (for the economy to magically kickstart I guess). But that’s not going to work out. And the economies are too interconnected to allow for bigger countries than Greece to fall.

Another important thing to point out is that all the so-called “PIIGS” (Portugal-Ireland-Italy-Greece-Spain), as is the commonly used degenerate term, are all different from each other and all have different reasons for why their economies are currently in such a mess. There is a dominant media narrative out there that blames the crisis on profligate Mediterranean governments, but this narrative is blatantly false. Spain for example ran budget surpluses until 2008, unlike ‘profligate’ Germany that did not even manage to stay under -3% for 4 years in a row during the ‘boom’ as mandated by Growth and Stability Pact (which they bargained for themselves – of course Germany did not have to pay the corresponding fines) .

And then came the economic crisis. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers the powers that be did not want that to happen again and started bailing out the banks that started falling like dominoes. European governments were pressured (also by the EC and other external powers) to bail out their over-leveraged banks (that took too high risks, allowed for by regulation pressured by the EC). Suddenly European countries spend trillions saving their banks. A government debt crisis ensued. Borrowing rates are much higher than the growth forecasts, leading to a debt trap. Financial markets started speculating against the apparently weaker peripheral European countries, so they could no longer borrow money from the private markets at reasonable rates, and borrowing from the core European countries at (barely..) better rates included conditions for neoliberal austerity – worsening the peripheral countries’ growth perspectives even more.

The structural problems inherent in the European Monetary Union (which plenty of people saw and warned for in ’99 but were ignored) became apparent. Only the ECB can print money. The ECB follows neoliberal monetary policy under which it is independent of government (and “populist appeals”) and is just there to maintain a low inflation rate. Member states gave up their monetary sovereignty to the ECB and the Stability and Growth pact was there to bring convergence on the inflation, interest, growth rates. But what we are stuck with is a Eurozone with one common monetary policy, while other socio-economic policy is on a national basis. A monetary union without fiscal union. JPMorgan recently looked whether the right conditions to set up a monetary  union in Europe and they found an astonishing amount of differences between the Eurozone´s member states in key variables. They compared it other hypothetical currency unions and it turns out that the “euro zone is the most implausible currency union of them all. It would be slightly more realistic, in fact, to bind together all the countries in the world that began with the letter “M””. The monetary union still worked while the economy was growing (even though it was partly credit-driven, especially in the “PIIGS”), but the uneven development within the Eurozone was brutally exposed when the economy came crashing down in 2008.

The Eurozone has been very good for capital that can freely move across borders looking for a profit to make, especially the big multinationals (often from the core countries) have benefited immensely. The European member-states however end up competing with each other in order to attract this capital. A race-to-the-bottom in order to improve competitiveness ensues.

Conventional wisdom proclaims there are two ways for a country to become more competitive. One is external devaluation, when individual countries run their own currency, they can print money, devaluate and thereby become more competitive. This is ruled out in the Eurozone, as only the ECB can print money [this is also why the UK outside the eurozone can run its current budget deficits without consequence]. The other way to become more competitive then is internal devaluation, which is is to reduce labour costs. Germany in the last 20 years has been quite busily doing just that, with even the German social-democrats (forgetting their old ideals and becoming neoliberals) increasing precarious employment with so-called “mini-jobs”, striking an union-employers agreement that agreed on lower wages in return of low unemployment, and by keeping wage increases under inflation.

According to neoliberal dogma the rest of Europe then has to compete against all that by lowering their own labour costs. That’s where this Holy Austerity Crusade comes from with the troika (ECB-EC-IMF) and Merkozy demanding wage-freezes, lower minimum wages, removal of pensions, cuts in public spending. Leading to unprecedented levels of social collapse and misery, with their economy going down by a fifth since 2007, with pensioners going through the garbage looking for food, suicides going up 22% a year, young people becoming drug addicts, with people being underemployed and not even having the money to pay the electricity bills. Looking at the mass levels of unemployment and increasingly lower economic forecasts, internal devaluation by lowering labour costs is simply not working. Low labour productivity has not been the cause of the problems of the “PIIGS” and lowering labour costs won’t the solution. The idea of Germany outsourcing jobs to Greece is nonsensical when East European countries with much lower costs of living are taken into account.

Unit labour costs index = 100, start = 1995
“Convergence gave way to divergence in the ability of each Eurozone state to compete. That can be measured by the costs of capitalist production: Germany just outperformed the likes of Greece, even though Greek workers put in the longest hours and were paid the lowest (see my post, Europe: default or devaluation,16 November 2011). Look at unit labour costs. Germany’s hardly moved as wages were held down and productivity was high. Greece’s rose 35% compared to Germany’s even though Greek productivity increased and labour toiled.” (From Micheal Roberts – Euro Calamity 12-12-2011)

But the powers that be are so stuck in their neoliberal dogma they just keep repeating the same lines. Unelected technocrats like Mr Mario Draghi of the ECB declare the social welfare state to be death. The people rightfully disagree with 11 governments collapsing due to the crisis so far.

The new constitutionalism of Europe

The pressure on European welfare states to balance budgets by cutting social spending comes external forces outside popular accountability; financial markets, foreign states, and in this crisis most importantly; the troika of EC, ECB and the IMF. In effect, European member-states have to put on the so-called “golden straitjacket” as coined by NYT columnist Thomas Friedman, shrink the state and privatize or suffer. But unlike what the hilarious writings and analogies of Friedman and others might want you to believe, this straitjacket is not something inevitable or natural phenomenon, but rather something that comes from political choices made by human beings.

It is important to note that what the periphery of Europe is going through currently is not exactly new. Their experience closely echo what Latin America and much of the third world went through since the 80s, which also had the IMF (together with the World Bank) put neoliberal austerity conditions (structural adjustment programs) on its loans, forcing poor countries to demolish their public sector and to privatize  basic public services. The world’s core-economies used its creditor status to the periphery through the IMF and World Bank to force these developing economies open for capital accumulation, to turn them dependent on exporting (raw) commodities (by foreign private companies), and to open up their labour markets to exploitation by companies from the core-economies.

A concept that helps us to make sense of how sovereign states are restrained in what economic policy they can pursue is that what Stephen Gill calls the ‘new constitutionalism’. Constitutions function as a control mechanism that set out the rules of governance and that restrain those in power on what they can do.  The new constitutionalism then is a process that aims to shield the new global political-economic structures from democratic rule and popular accountability in order to grant privileged rights to corporate capital and large investors. It is all about market efficiency, discipline and confidence. Policy credibility and consistency viewed in the light of neo-classical economic theory. Measures are taken to reconfigure the state apparatus into facilitators of market values and market discipline. This new constitutionalism has been deliberately pursued by international institutions as the IMF, World Bank and WTO, and the world’s most powerful states. The separation of the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ is redefined, market policies are ‘locked-in’ externally (under the WTO for example; nations are in many ways prevented from defending their national industries), and elected governments are no longer able to do decide over the most fundamental.

The new constitutionalism can be seen as most central in the European Union. The European Monetary Union has been a long term project to abolish popular influence on macro-economic policy. A substantial amount of all regulation (some say over half) now comes from the EU, over which mostly unelected eurocrats in Brussels have decided, often in cooperation with unelected lobbyists from the corporate world. The fiscal pact that was signed by 25 of 27 member states at the previous EU summit will entail another serious escalation in the new constitutionalism of Europe. They call the pact a “fiscal stability union”, but “rather than creating an inter-regional insurance mechanism involving counter-cyclical transfers, the version on offer would constitutionalize pro-cyclical adjustment in recession-hit countries, with no countervailing measures to boost demand elsewhere in the eurozone. Describing this as a ‘fiscal union’, as some have done, constitutes a near-Orwellian abuse of language“. As with the Sixpack it will essentially imply sacrificing democratic participation on macro-economic policy in favor of imposing austerity on the member-states. The fiscal pact will enforce fiscal budget balancing by adopting debt brake and an automatic austerity mechanism. These measures are signed up as a treaty under international law so it can sidestep European law, which would have assured at least some democratic and judicial control within the EU. Furthermore, national governments are pressured into ratifying the treaty as it used as a pre-condition for receiving aid from the European Stability Mechanism (the new bail-out fund for when the crisis hits again). Considering that currently 24 out of 27 EU countries are currently running a deficit, this will in essence mean constitutionalizing “austerity forever” and put the right to collective bargaining under further assault.

The crisis of capitalism

It is important to link the eurocrisis with the wider crisis of capitalism in the Western world. Although the total government debt compared with GDP for Eurozone countries is much lower than that of the US, solving the structural problems within the Eurozone would refocus the attention of the financial markets and media towards the US. But even then, with the eurocrisis resolved, Europe would still be part of a world that is unlikely to return to the growth periods we saw in the 20th century, especially in the Bretton Woods period after WW2.

After the oil crisis of the 1970s and the end of Bretton Woods the world economy saw an increasing amount of recurrent crises that started following up on each other on increasingly shorter intervals. The boom and bust cycle of the core-economies has been getting shorter and shorter. The Great Recession that we have been in since the housing bubble in the US burst in 2007 has seen lowest recovery since the Great Depression; a jobless recovery even though fortune 500 corporations and Wall Street were promptly highly profitable again. Many European countries, including the core-economies, are slipping back to recession. It is time to question why this is the case, to find out where the Great Recession came from, and why a normal recovery is not coming around. In other words, it is time to question the structural underpinnings and assumptions of our capitalist system. These are questions that are ignored by the mainstream media and economics, as Nouriel Roubini argued: “Crisis economics is the study of how and why markets fail.  Much of mainstream economics, by contrast, is obsessed with showing how and why markets work – and work well.”

So what is the official line of where the great recession came from? They did not see it coming, claiming it was a black swan, a perfect storm that can only come together once or twice a hundred years. Alan Greenspan found out that his ideology was not right, that it was not working . The dominant neoclassical school was obsessed with its beautiful mathematical models, turning a blind eye to human irrationality and market imperfections. The finger is then pointed at deregulation, banking gone wild with deriviatives and packaged securities of which trillions are traded but which almost nobody is really able to value. This financialization that had less and less to do with the real underlying economy however also happened for a reason.

There is the underconsumptionist thesis which links increased inequality with an increased risk of major economic crisis. The argument here is that lower consumer demand can lead to a recession, especially when this is not counteracted by for example public spending as proposed by the Keynesians.  In the last 30 years wages have stagnated relative to productivity (they used to go up together in the golden decades of capitalism post WW2), as the rich have been fighting class war and have been winning in the words of Warren Buffet. And the decrease in wages leads to lower consumptions; this was countered by extending credit to households (creditcards for all!), but that cannot go on forever, it´s a debt bubble that has to burst and this first happened in the subprime mortgages.

Following this logic through shows that less money going to labour and the increased inequality (which greatly increased almost everywhere the last 30 years) that comes with it greatly destabilizes the system. The rich at the top and corporations have an increasing amount of money to invest with a decreasing amount of profitable places to invest in due to underconsumption (overproduction being a different side to the same coin). A dominant myth is that it’s good for corporations and rich people to have loads of money as they are the ‘job creators’; give them tax-breaks and they will invest in innovative businesses that will create jobs. In reality, instead of reinvesting profits in expanding their activities, corporations prefer to pay excessive bonuses to their executives, pay out dividends to shareholders, or engage in financial speculation. While governments are forced into austerity and unemployment remains high, US corporations are hoarding more than a trillion dollar in savings (it’s the same in Europe – Dutch businesses have over 210 billion in corporate savings). Instead of investing it in the real economy and ‘creating’ jobs, capital is pumped it into speculative bubbles all over the world (leading to increasingly short boom and bust cycles). An abundance of cheap labour abroad, the ensuing offshoring, and new technology and automation of production further depresses the share labour in the core-economies receives from corporate profits.

An alternative theory that corresponds with most of the reasoning outlined above comes from Marxists that look at the declining profitability of capitalist production. This theory is however fundamentally different on an important aspect. It doesn’t see neoliberalism as a political-ideological movement, as class-warfare waged by the rich, but as the result of limited political choices that comes from the problems inherent in the capitalist production process that became increasingly problematic in the years of stagflation in the 70s after the golden years of capitalism. The tendency of the rate of profit to fall argues that improvements in technology and higher productivity, while increasing the amount of material wealth, lower the profit that can be extracted out of (productive) labour, leading to crises and “poverty in the midst of plenty”. This lack of profitability rather than lack of ‘effective demand’ (/underconsumption) then explains the financialization that we have seen since the 70s, in which stockbrokers attempt to turn money into more money by inventing increasingly complicated ´ficticious capital´ (derivatives etc). But when this over-investment in credit markets is not backed up by real profitable investments in the global economy the bubble bursts, hence the great recession. The theory is logical and sounds convincing. Empirically proving it is however a different matter. There are many disagreements on how to calculate the rate of profit. I am not an expert and find it hard to judge the arcane and heated debates that Marxist economists have on this issue, but I can recommend the writings of Andrew Kliman, Micheal Roberts and Choonara’s write-up.

What both the underconsumptionist and falling profitability thesis have in common is that we should stop accepting the attack on so-called ‘entitlements’ and that it is time for a fundamental rethink. Think about it. In many ways we have never had it this good. In much of Western-Europe we have constructed welfare-states, where people that are unfortunate enough to become sick are taken care of and treated in modern hospitals without ending up indebted for the rest of their lives, where people unfortunate enough not to find a job receive help from the government and do not become a burden on their families and community, where people after a life of work can enjoy their well-deserved pension. We have beautiful modern technology. Smartphones with access to internet everywhere. Small machines which fit in your pocket, that can stream all the music and movies of the world. More people than ever enjoy modern housing that is keeping us dry and warm. Relatively speaking we have never had this few people producing food for billions of people. Much hard manual labour has been replaced by machines and robots. Assembly lines require less people than ever before. Productivity has skyrocketed. Why then is it still expected that people work 40 hours a week? Why then are our hard-fought social securities going down. Why then is the newest generation the first generation since WW2 that is beyond doubt worse off than the previous generation? Why are these questions not asked and do we simply accept the austerity and increasing social misery as a given that we will just have to live with?

Margaret Thatcher’s mantra of there-is-no-alternative (TINA) is often repeated. Fact is however: there has to be. For the sake of humanity there has to be. In this day and age it is still hard to imagine a live outside our capitalist reality. The people thinking out alternatives often seem utopian, but the real utopians are those who think the current neoliberal order will be the best for humanity. Because where does this endless drive of deregulation and privatization lead us? What exactly is this end game they envision, these so-called liberal-democratic states in a free-market capitalist world in the supposed end of history? Is this truly the final goal we as humanity can achieve, is there nothing better? To be endlessly dragging ourselves down to become more competitive? You really think that this will lead to a point where there’s a world’s labour force of 5+ billion people employed in 9 to 5 jobs and where everyone is able to live on a decent standard of living? That to me seems like the real utopianism.

Neoliberalism as a world agenda or even as a European one is also easily discredited. These reforms in order to become more competitive by lowering labour costs also lower the world’s total capitalist investment, as the market becomes smaller due to lower demand (because workers can buy less). Individual regions and countries´ manufactures may increase production by following a neoliberal agenda due to a reduction in labour costs, but it comes at the expense of the rest of the world. Stagnating wages (relative to productivity and even inflation) and flexibilization of the labour market with “mini-jobs” may have been quite successful for Germany, but it comes at the expense of the rest of Europe. It’s a race-to-the-bottom basically and it’s the utopian aspect of neoliberalism that they never think through the bigger picture of their reforms. The new constitutionalism with the reforms of the Washington Consensus through the IMF, WB and WTO were good for Western corporations and capital, which in theory trickles down to the common people in the Western world, but as a result of the reforms all over the world, the West-European model of social-democracy is under threat as well. In the wider perspective we’re all going down because of the neoliberal reforms. These are basically capitalist grounds on which the neoliberal agenda has to be opposed. If they want to save European capitalism, the folks in Brussels better start to listen.

Idealisme en de nieuwe generatie (Dutch)

De afgelopen decenia is er een beeld gecreerd van onze generatie als de eerste echte post-ideologische generatie. Tot voor kort leefden we zogenaamd in Fukuyama’s  ‘end of history’, een wereld waar het kapitalisme gewonnen had, met onze liberale democratie als eindpunt, waar geen plek was voor de grote collectieve ideologien. Verder zijn we apatisch, opgegroeid met tv, vooral met onszelf bezig in onze comfortabele consumenten leventjes, en te ´realistich´ voor het ‘naïeve’ idealisme van onze ouders’ generatie. Wij vormen de zogenaamde ‘ik-generatie’, individualistisch en extreem narcistisch, waar alles buiten onze directe leefomgeving er niet zoveel toe doet. Dit beeld van de nieuwe generatie is grotendeels onzin. Er zijn genoeg jongeren die vol zitten met idealisme,die nieuwsgierig zijn naar hoe de wereld in elkaar steekt, die vol zitten met empathie voor minder bedeelden, en die zich wel degelijk zorgen maken over bijvoorbeeld klimaatverandering en de apocalyptische proporties van rampen die ons daarmee te wachten staat. Het idealisme is er wel. Het probleem is echter dat de energie van dit idealisme in de verkeerde plekken gestoken wordt.

Nou laat ik mensen die hun idealisme omzetten in het consumeren van de juiste producten (van Max Havelaar producten tot een Toyota Prius) even buiten beschouwing. Ik wil het bijvoorbeeld meer hebben over de jongeren die na hun studie (of tijdens), vol idealisme, aan een slecht betaalde (of onbetaalde) stage beginnen bij een non-profit, waar ze terecht komen in een geprofessionaliseerde werkomgeving, met 9-tot-5 kantoorwerk, waar het probleem van fundraising een centrale rol inneemt, en waar marketing (wat nog altijd niet veel meer is dan het manipuleren van mensen) vaak een nog grotere rol speelt dan voor een multinational. De afhankelijkheid van private en publieke donors voor financiering en de wil om maar toegang te blijven houden tot multinationals, regeringen en hun conferenties leidt tot een politiek van compromis. Bovendien zijn het in deze geprofessionaliseerde organizaties vaak ook nog de carriére-mensen die omhoog klimmen en het voor het zeggen hebben of krijgen. NGOs richten zich vaak op allerlei belangrijke (maar niet fundamentale) side-issues, die allemaal binnen de logica van de ‘vrije’ markt (en het systeem) worden behandeld. Eén van de gebruikelijke bezigheden is het promoten van bijvoorbeeld ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR), terwijl het  doel van een multinational vrijwel altijd het maximalizeren van winst voor aandeelhouders zal zijn (een legale verplichting zelfs), waardoor CSR nooit veel meer dan een marketing gimmick zal zijn (of een excuus om broodnodige overheids regulatie te vermijden). Kortom, non-profits zijn over het algemeen volledig gecoöpteerd door de dominante politiek-economische structuren. Het zijn plekken met geen enkele vorm van systeem kritiek, waar al het idealisme uit je gezogen wordt. Het is dan ook niet gek, maar wel typerend, dat zelfs ‘gewone werkende’ (en tot voor kort ‘post-ideologosiche’) Amerikanen in de recente Occupy protesten al snel uitkomen op wereldperspectieven en slogans die in radicalisme veel verder gaan dan die van de grote meerderheid van NGOs.

Een andere vorm van activisme waarin veel jongeren hun idealisme in steken is microkrediet. Het probleem is hier niet alleen dat zelfs het populaire Kiva.org ordinaire for-profit “field partners” heeft die woeker-rentes eisen van gemiddeld 35%, maar vooral ook dat er simpelweg voor de arme entrepeneurs maar een beperkt aantal mogelijkheden zijn om succesvol hun geleende begin kapitaal om te zetten naar iets groters. De claim van de Nobelprijs winnende econoom Muhammad Yunnus, stichter van de microkrediet beweging,  dat globale armoede door middel van microkrediet weggevaagd gaat worden worden is ondenkbaar en utopisch. Naast microkrediet zijn enkele vrienden van mij ook helemaal weg van ‘social entrepeneurship’, binnen de logica van de markt, dictactuur en ongelijkheid bestrijden, vaak door middel van allerlei irritante social media strategiën, maar natuurlijk zonder de onderliggende politiek-economische structuren an sich te bedreigen.

Nu wil ik niet het talloze goede werk van de Oxfam Novibs, Greenpeaces, Amnesty Internationals, enzovoort ontkennen.  Er zijn ook honderden voorbeelden van social entrepreneurship waar mensen groot profijt van hebben. En ook niet elke vorm van micro krediet verlening aan armen leidt tot gigantische schuldenlasten waaruit slachtoffers geen andere uitweg dan zelfmoord weten. Natuurlijk, er zit niks kwaads in al dit goed bedoelde idealisme. Maar de overeenkomst in al deze populaire vormen van idealisme is alleen wel dat er geen potentie in zit voor het soort sociale verandering dat wel daadwerkelijk nodig is. Er zit geen enkele bedreiging in voor de status quo en elke vorm van systeem kritiek ontbreekt. Overal komt het neer op individuele verantwoordelijkheid, dat iedereen maar voor zichzelf moet zorgen, maar dan wel binnen de logica van de markt die buiten discussie staat, en om vooral ook niet publieke diensten te ‘misbruiken’ (aangezien anderen daar dan weer voor opdraaien). Het is strikt individualistisch en sluit aan op een wereld waar alles in economische termen wordt gezien, en waar alles in kosten en baten wordt berekend. Als we deze logica te ver doordenken kunnen we wat mij betreft net zo goed ook wel meteen collectief zelfmoord doen als menselijkheid.

Maar het is wel duidelijk hoe dominant deze logica is voor jongeren tegenwoordig. Zelfs veel van de meer idealistische jongeren nu willen van jongs af aan carriére proberen te maken. Een duidelijk voorbeeld is ook de studiekeuze van jongeren. Kijk naar de populariteit van MBA studies, die een 20 jaar geleden nog amper studenten kon trekken buiten ‘dat over-de-top kapitalistische’ Amerika. Onder het motto van individuele verantwoordelijkheid wordt het je nu afgeraden om een studie als Filosofie te kiezen, want ‘eigen schuld’ als je na je studie geen baan kan vinden. Beter doe je één van die studies die er voornamelijk zijn om studenten te verkleinen tot een zo effectief mogelijk scharnier in de machine van het systeem. In plaats van het oude Bildungsideaal, waarin studie tot verlichting en zelf ontplooiing dient, worden we als robots klaargestoomd voor het bedrijfsleven. Aan filosofie doe je maar in je ‘vrije tijd’.

Al het opgenoemde idealisme; van politiek consumeren, het merendeel van het non-profit werk, microkrediet en social entrepeneurship, valt binnen de neoliberale logica van individuele verantwoordelijkheid en markt-denken. Maar het is juist deze neoliberale logica waar tegen jonge idealisten zich tegen moeten keren. Makkelijker gezegd dan gedaan natuurlijk. Maar een begin zit zich in een terugkeer van een protest cultuur. Er moet een eind komen aan wat je de ‘geenstijlificatie’ van protest zou kunnen noemen, het in de zeik nemen van alle radicalere vormen van idealisme. Een Geenstijl vermaakt de verveelde massa van mensen die in hun saaie 9-5 kantoorbanen de doelloze leegte van hun bestaan weg moeten ‘reaguren’ op het internet. Dit bittere cynisme dat zich als ‘realisme’ verschuilt voedt een misplaatst superioriteitsgevoel boven de mensen die wel inzien dat radicale verandering nodig en daarvoor in actie komen. Het is tijd om over de sociale druk tot apathisch conformisme heen te stappen en om weer de straten in te nemen voor onze idealen.